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1993 / Indigent Medical Care in California
Medical indigence is a silent, largely invisible epidemic....
Occasionally medical indigence roars into public consciousness,

usually in the case of a needy young transplant candidate or a
patient who has been dumped by a hospital. But for the most part,

it does not happen under the noses of those who provide health
care or who formulate its policy
INTRODUCTION

Amidst growing public concern about health care, and particularly
about the twenty-two and one-half percent of California's population who
are without insurance to pay for their health care,2 California counties
have struggled to meet the health care needs of indigent people who are
without other access to medical services. Our counties have a long history
of legal responsibility for meeting the core elements of subsistence3 (food,
shelter and medical care) for indigent people, although this obligation has
recently undergone statutory changes of great potential significance.' This
Article reviews California law 5 concerning section 17000 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code and the legal obligations of counties to cover the
medical care needs of their indigent residents. The Article also provides

a brief overview of state and county indigent medical care programs for
the last three decades. 7 The closing section suggests a conceptual

framework for consideration of past, current and potential legal standards
for levels of health care that are provided to indigent people.

1. Emily Friedman, The Torturer's Horse, 261 JAMA 1481 (1989).
2. Health Care Costs and Health Insurance Coverage in California:Hearings on Health Care Refonn:
Current Trends in Health Care Costs and Health Insurance Coverage, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1993)
(testimony of E. Richard Brown, Ph.D.) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal). The estimates of health
insurance coverage are based on the authors' analyses of the March 1990 Current Population Survey.
3.
Poverty Resistance Ctr. v. Hart, 213 Cal. App. 3d 295, 307, 271 Cal. Rptr. 214, 222 (1989); see
Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 503, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 722 (1986) (listing the "most basic
needs ... food, shelter, utilities, clothing, medical care, transportation").
4.
See infra notes 112-125 (discussing the recent statutory changes made to § 17000 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code and other laws affecting the level of medical care services that must be provided
to indigent people).
5. Although this Article concentrates on legal obligations of counties in California, many of the 3,000
counties in the United States also provide health care for the poor. See generally PATRCiA BuO.ER, TOO POOR
To BE SiICK: AccEss TO MEDIcAL CARE FOR THE U NsuRED 40 (1988).
6. See infra notes 9-73 and accompanying text.
7.
See infra notes 74-240 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 241-292 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

A. A Brief History of County Medical Assistance

California counties have a long history of responsibility for caring for
their indigent residents' needs under Welfare and Institutions Code section
17000. 9 Although the medical care aspect of counties' responsibility is
well established,' 0 counties can choose whether to deliver this medical care

through county hospitals, county clinics, a purchased-care system, a
managed

care system,

or some combination

of these

delivery

components." County medical care programs operate as a complement
to federal or state health care programs, providing a "safety net" for low
income people who are not eligible or otherwise have no access to federal
and state financed health care. The largest, most significant federal-state
indigent health care program in California is Medi-Cal.
After Congress enacted the Medicaid program in 1965 to provide

health care for specific categories of indigent people, 12 California enacted
a basic health care program (now called Medi-Cal) 3 for categorically
needy people whose eligibility was linked to federal financial aid
categories.1 4 Medi-Cal also covered "medically needy" people incapable
of meeting their medical expenses, but ineligible for federal financial aid
due to income or resources above the statutory maximums. 15 Until the
reforms of 1982, the Medi-Cal Reform Program of 1971 was the most
important change in the scope and direction of Medi-Cal1 6 One part of
9. See generally Jacobus tenBroek, California'sWelfare Law-Origins and Development, 45 CAL. L.
REV. 241 (1957).
10. Simone Workman, County Hospitalsin Crisis:Legislative Response to Assure Indigent Health Care,
10 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 331, 333 (1977).
11. See Randall R. Bovberg & William G. Kopit, Coverageand Carefor the Medically Indigent: Public
and Private Options, 19 IND. L. Ra. 857, 881-84 (1986) (describing four different delivery models for local
indigent health programs throughout the country).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396(u) (1989 & Supp. H 1991). This subchapter is usually referred to as
Medicaid.
13. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 14000.4 (West 1991).
14. Id. § 14005.1 (West 1991).
15. Id §§ 14005.7, 14051 (West 1991); see also 1974 Cal. Stat. ch. 1240, sec. 9, at 2688 (enacting CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 14050.1) (defining a categorically needy persons as those falling within federal
regulations); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14051.5 (West Supp. 1993) (defining a medically needy person as
anyone who receives in-home supportive services and whose income resources are insufficient to provide for
health care or coverage).
16. See generally CALIFORNIA CENTER FOR HEALTH STATSICS, THE MEDI-CAL PROGRAM: A BRIEF
SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS, DATA MATTERS TOPICAL REPORTS, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
SERVICES, Report No. 0656-001 (Sept. 1979) (revised) [hereinafter THE MEDI-CAL PROGRAM: A BRIEF
SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS].
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the 1971 reforms expanded Medi-Cal eligibility to include county

medically needy children and adults under age sixty-five not otherwise
Medi-Cal eligible. 17 It was assumed that this new, "medically indigent"

category of Medi-Cal eligibles"8 would cover most of the county medical
indigents, 9 thereby bringing state and federal funds to the county hospital
systems that had been treating an estimated 800,000 "working poor"

people not previously eligible for Medi-Cal.2 In fact, some counties
made this total Medi-Cal coverage assumption a self-fulfilling reality by

adopting the position that any person not qualifying for Medi-Cal under
the expanded eligibility criteria was assumed to be capable of paying for
his or her health care. 2 ' In June 1978, voter approval of Proposition 13
sharply restricted counties' ability to raise revenues, bringing increased
budget competition to all county-funded programs.22 The next year,
Assembly Bill (AB) 8 was enacted to provide fiscal relief to counties
coping with greatly reduced tax revenues.' AB 8's health-related
provisions helped to protect spending for county public health and medical

care programs, by adopting a distribution formula for state funds that
included a state share that had to be matched by county funds. 24
In 1982, responsibility for the Medically Indigent Adults (MIAs)
traveled almost full circle when these people were eliminated from the

17. 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 577, sec. 12, at 1110 (enacting CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE §§ 14000-14029).
18. Id.; 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 577, sec. 23, at 1115 (enacting CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE § 14052). These
statutes designated anyone covered by the new eligibility expansion as a "noncategorically related needy person,"
but the more commonly used phrase is "medically indigent." See 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 328, sec. 8.3, at 1575
(referring to the repeal of California Welfare and Institutions Code § 14005.13 as the elimination of medically
indigent adults from the Medi-Cal program); THE MEDI-CAL PROGRAM: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS,
supra note 16, at 10.
19. REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDrET COMMTTE, ANALYSIS
OF THE BUDGET BILL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, at 628 (Fiscal Year 1974-75) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF
THE 1974-75 BuDGET].
20. THm MEDI-CAL PROGRAM: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS, supra note 16, at 10-11.
21. There is some question as to what persons, if any, outside of the Medi-Cal medically indigent
eligibles, are the county's responsibility under § 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. ANALYSIS OF THE
1974-75 BUDGET, supra note 19, at 629.
22. This ballot initiative was officially titled "Tax Limitation" by the Attorney General's office, but is
popularly referred to as "Proposition 13," after the number assigned to it on the ballot. This ballot initiative
limited a county's tax assessments on property within its boundaries. Proposition 13 of June 1978 was added
to the California Constitution at Article XIIIA. CAL. CONST. Art. XIIIA (implementing legislation codified at
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 50-100.5 (West 1987)).
23. See 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 282, sec. 87, at 1047-51 (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 16700-

16718).
24. Another part of the health care funding formula included a per capita allocation based on each
county's population. Both parts of this formula were adjusted annually to reflect changes in population and cost
of living. For a brief description of the AB 8 program, see THE 1991-92 BUDGEr PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES,
REPORT FROM THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE at 180.
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Medi-Cal

program and

were transferred

back to the counties.25

Twenty-four of California's fifty-eight counties assumed responsibility for
the MIAs, while the other thirty-four counties chose the County Medical

Services Program (CMSP) option of contracting back with the state for
their MIA program. 26 Although the CMSP option provided counties with

administrative convenience and to some extent shifted financial risk back
to the state, it did not relieve participating counties of their section 17000
responsibility for health care. 27 The 1982 MIA transfer saved the state

about $110 million for that year, but also resulted in fragmentation of
medical benefits, eligibility criteria, and access to medical care as many28

counties developed their own programs for the medically indigent.

Some counties tried to provide the former MIAs with the same care they
would have received under Medi-Cal, while other counties applied more
restrictive eligibility standards and minimum benefits.29
In 1988, a decade after creation of the AB 8 program, voters approved

a cigarette tax ballot initiative that had important effects on indigent
medical care. Proposition 99, the Tobacco Tax and Health Protection Act

of 1988, 3' raised cigarette taxes by 25 cents per pack, directing
approximately two-thirds3 of the revenue raised by this new tax32 to
25. 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 328, see. 8, at 1575 (repealing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14005.13); 1982 Cal.
Stat. ch. 328, sec. 8.3, at 1575-76 (declaring the legislative intent to transfer funds to counties to be consolidated
with the existing county health services funds to provide health services to low income persons and other persons
not eligible for Medi-Cal); 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 328, sec. 8.5, at 1576 (enacting CAL. WELP & INST. CODE §
14005.16). For a description of the 1982 changes to Medi-Cal and their impact on California's poor people, see
Christopher Bellavita, California's Health Policy Reform and the Poor, 24 PUB. AVF. REP. No. 5, 1-10
(University of California, Berkeley, October 1983).
26. Fifteen of these twenty-four counties were required to assume responsibility for MIAs because they
had a population of more than 300,000. The other nine counties that took responsibility for operating their own
MIA program were smaller counties that chose to do so. This group of large and small counties is often referred
to as the "MISP" group of counties because they operate under the Medically Indigent Services Program (MISP).
The remaining counties, all of them with less than 300,000 residents, are considered "CMSP counties" because
they choose to contract back to the state through the County Medical Services Program (CMSP). Bellavita, supra
note 25, at 5; see CAL. WELt. & INST. CODE § 16905 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that a MISP county is own
which administers, either directly or through contracts with selected providers, its own indigent health services
program); id. § 16901 (West 1991) (defining a CMSP county as a county which contracts with the department
for the administration of health services).
27. CAt. WE.F. & INST. CODE § 16709(c) (West 1991).
28. Bellavita, supra note 25, at 5.
29. Id
30. See CAL REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30121-30130 (West Supp. 1993) (codifying Proposition 99).
31. Forty-five percent of the revenues raised by Proposition 99 are required to be deposited in the
Hospital Services Account and Physician Services Account. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 30124(b) (West 1992).
Another 25 percent of the revenues is deposited in the Unallocated Account. Id. § 30124(b) (West 1992).
Subsequent legislation has allocated most of the Unallocated Account to the same medical care-related purposes
as the funds from the Hospital and Physician Services Accounts. See 1989 Ca]. Stat. ch. 1331, sec. 10, at 46964700 (uncodified) (containing allocations from the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund for the 1989-
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pay hospitals and physicians for treatment of people who lack private
coverage or federal funding and who cannot afford to pay for those

services.33 To implement the requirement that Proposition 99 funds be
used to supplement rather than to fund existing levels of service, 34 the

legislation that initially allocated Proposition 99 funds for health and
medical care activities set forth several specific maintenance of effort

requirements for counties to continue current levels of indigent care
funding and service.35
In 1991 and 1992, California lawmakers struggled to craft a state
budget and other statutes in light of massive budget gaps. The 1991-92
budget adopted in July 1991 was designed to resolve a gap between
revenues and expenditures that had grown from $7 billion in January 1991

to $14.3 billion in May 1991.36 While the State grappled with its budget
problems, many of California's counties also faced increasing financial
stress. In fact, Butte County threatened to declare bankruptcy. 37

With this bleak financial backdrop, in January 1991, Governor Wilson
proposed a realignment of state and local programs that included a transfer
of responsibility for the AB 8 county health services program. This
realignment,38 characterized as a major component of the state plan to

1990 fiscal year); 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 278, sees. 24-43, at 1536-46 (uncodified) (containing allocations from the
Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund for the next three fiscal years, 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93).
32. Letter from Kristi Anderson, Associate Budget Analyst, Department of Finance, State of California,
Unpublished figures (Jan. 29, 1993) (copy on file with the PacificLaw Journal)(stating that the total Proposition
99 revenues have fallen from a high of $569 million for fiscal year 1989-90 to an estimated $512 million for
fiscal year 1992-93).
33. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 30122(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
34. Id. § 30125 (West Supp. 1993).
35. Counties were required to maintain a funding match based on their 1988-89 expenditures and the
same number of indigent medical care outpatient visits as in 1988-89. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 1331, see. 9, at 5427,
5431 (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 16990, 16995). Counties were also prohibited from imposing more
stringent eligibility standards or reducing the scope of benefits, using November 1988 as the basis of comparison.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16995 (West 1991).
36. THE 1992-93 BUDGET: PERSPECnVES AND ISSUES, REPORT FROM THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S
OFFICE TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMrITn, 7-8 [hereinafter 1992-93 BUDGET. PERSPECTIVES AND
ISSUES].
37. Id. at 160. See generally, RICHARD P. SIMPSON & CARY S. JUNG, CALIFORNIA COUNTMS
FOUNDATION, CALIFORNIA COUNTIES ON THE FISCAL FAULT LINE: A STUDY OF THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF
CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (November 1990).
38. The 1991-92 realignment was implemented through several pieces of legislation developed by a
legislative administrative task force. See generally 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 87, sec. 1, 3, at 232 (enacting CAL.
REV & TAX CODE § 10753.1) (repealing CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6276, enacting CAL. REV. & TAX CODE
§§ 10753.1, 10753.7, 11001.5 and amending CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 10753, 10753.2 ) (providing for the
allocation of vehicle license fees); 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 91, sec. 2-3, at 396 (repealing and reenacting CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 257) (requiring counties to collect enrollment fees under the California Children's
Services Act). These bills affected a total of 16 programs in the health and welfare area. 1992-93 BUDGET:
PERSPECTVES AND ISSUES, supra note 36, at 105.
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address its "significant funding gap" for 1991-92, proposed to eliminate a
total of approximately $900 million in state funding for local mental
health, public health, and indigent medical care programs. Such a
realignment would also provide counties with equivalent additional
revenues from increased taxes on alcohol and vehicle licenses.39 As it
was finally enacted, the package of realignment measures accounted for a
total of $2.2 billion of projected increases in county revenues to offset an
equivalent amount of state General Fund savings and increased county
sharing costs.' The statutes for AB 8 County Health Services and for the
Medically Indigent Services Program (MISP) were eliminated, resulting in
cost shifts of $503 million and $348 million, respectively, from the state

to the counties.41

The budget years following realignment have continued to reflect
substantial decline in the state's fiscal fortunes. 42 The impact of this fiscal
decline on county medical care obligations was made clear by the 1993
enactment of legislation that allowed counties to dramatically reduce their
general indigent assistance aid levels. 43 This same legislation also
appeared to anticipate current and future reductions in the Medi-Cal
program by stating that a county shall not be required to fund or provide
indigent medical care services that have been reduced or eliminated from
the Medi-Cal program.'
B. Who Receives County Medical Care?
The history of Medi-Cal and of county-only indigent medical care
illustrates how closely these two programs have interacted with each other
on a practical, program and fiscal basis. Even now, with legal
responsibility for medical care to non-categorically linked indigents clearly
transferred to the counties, Medi-Cal reimbursement is a vital thread in the
fabric of county health care systems. Many providers who serve large
numbers of Medi-Cal patients also care for medically indigent people,
providing continuity of care for individuals and families who may move

39.

1992-93 BurDGr PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES, supra note 36, at 104.

40.

Id.

41.
42.

Id. at 105, 112.
Id. at 5.

43.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.6(a) (West Supp. 1993) (allowing a county that demonstrates

"significant financial distress" to reduce its general assistance aid levels to 40 percent of the federal poverty
level).

44.

Id. § 17030 (West Supp. 1993).
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into and out of Medi-Cal eligibility.45 Medi-Cal revenues also serve an
important role as fiscal support and even subsidies for providers who serve
medically indigent people not eligible for Medi-Cal.4 Although the
federal-state funded Medi-Cal program and the county-funded section
17000 programs are closely related in many practical and financial aspects,
they are governed by different legal requirements. The remainder of this
Article concentrates only on the legal requirements for county indigent
health care programs, particularly the requirements for the minimum
standards of care that these programs must meet.
Who are the indigent people served by county medical assistance? A
recent survey of all California counties indicates that unemployed,
non-working, or seasonally employed adults were most frequently
identified by county respondents as the largest group of medically indigent
people.4 7 Working adults comprised a smaller but still sizable portion of
county medical indigents, while undocumented people and mothers and
infants made up still smaller proportions of this patient population." The
categories representing the smallest number of county indigent care users
were homeless and children and adolescents. 49 The first category of
under-employed or unemployed adults, which was identified as the largest
proportion of the medically indigent, was also reported to be both the
fastest growing group and one of the two groups with the highest levels
of unmet medical needs.5" The other group with high unmet need levels
was undocumented people, particularly for the larger counties.5
C. ConstitutionalRights and County Assistance
Federal constitutional provisions allow government health care
programs for the medically indigent, but clearly do not require them.52

45. 71E DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES PLAN FoR EXPANDING MEDI-CAL MANAGED CARE:
PROTECTNG VuLNERABLE POPULATIONS 51 (March 31, 1993).
46. Letter to Molly Coye, Director, Department of Health Services, from Mary Pittman, President and
CEO, California Association of Public Hospitals 6 (January 27, 1993) (copy on file with the Pacific Law

Journal).
47. David Carrell, et al., Indigent Medical Care in California: Views From the Bottom (July 1993)
(unpublished paper presented to the Association for Health Studies Research (AHSR)) (copy on file with the

author).
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.

51. Id.
52. See Bovberg & Kopit, supra note 11, at 872; Michael A. Dowell, State and Local Government Legal
Responsibilities to Provide Medical Carefor the Poor, 3 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 3 (1988-89).
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However, courts have found Fourteenth Amendment fights for people in
federally-funded indigent assistance programs. 53 These rights even include
indigent people who are not eligible for these nationally established
programs, but who live in a state such as California with local indigent
assistance programs.m
The legal framework for California's county-level indigent assistance
programs allows much more local discretion than the framework for
federally established indigent aid programs. For example, California's
Medi-Cal program is governed by more than 550 pages of statutory
language55 while this state's local medical assistance programs for
indigents operate under a broad state statutory mandate contained in just
a handful of pages.56 One legal commentary that addressed California's
general assistance programs for indigents pointed out the practical
difference between federal assistance programs, with their detailed laws
governing all recipients, and local assistance programs, which can vary
widely from county to county.57 Although this commentary suggested a
possible constitutional requirement to minimize county-by-county
variations in general assistance programs, it acknowledged that "the
constitutional question is most difficult where, as in California, general
assistance programs are totally funded and administered by local
governments." 58
The local control and county-by-county variability of California's
general relief programs was also a focus of Griffeth v. Detrich,59 a federal
trial court decision that emphasized the "diverse and variable nature" of
general relief in California and each county's considerable discretion in
establishing eligibility criteria for reliefP" When that decision was
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the appellate court took a

53. The landmark case is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which held that due process required
a hearing prior to terminating a person's benefits in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

program. For a discussion that contrasts the jurisprudence of welfare entitlement first developed by social
workers with that developed later by lawyers, see generally William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention
of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REv. 1 (1985).
54. Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 970 (1980).

55.
56.

See CAL WEaL. & INsT. CODE §§ 14000.4-14029 (West 1991).
See id. §§ 17000, 17000.5, 17001 (West 1991 and West Supp. 1992).

57. Harold W. Horowitz & Diana L. Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public
Education and PublicAssistance ProgramsFrom Place to Place Within a State, 15 UCLA L. REV. 787, 815
(1968).
58. Id. at 815.
59. 448 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
60. Griffethv. Detrich, 448F. Supp. 1137, 1140-41 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
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different view of inter-county variability in local assistance programs."
In Griffeth, the appellate court found that people applying for general
assistance benefits had a constitutional right to eligibility determination
procedures that meet due process requirements. 62 The plaintiff had
applied to the San Diego County Department of Public Welfare on August
18, 1976 for general relief after she was fired as a waitress because her
employer claimed that she dressed improperly. 63 Although the plaintiff
disputed the alleged impropriety, her application was denied because she
had apparently been fired for cause. 64 The plaintiff requested and received
administrative review, but the supervisor denied her application after trying
once, unsuccessfully, to reach her former employer.6' After the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, 6 the Ninth
Circuit reversed, agreeing with the plaintiff's assertion that the interest in
general relief benefits is an interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.67 The case was remanded to the district court for
determination of the process due to protect the plaintiffs' interest in
general relief benefits.6"
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the mandatory nature of
general relief, which required each county to provide this assistance, and
the detailed regulations adopted by San Diego county that set forth specific
objective eligibility criteria for receiving this assistance. 69 The court relied
heavily on a then recent Supreme Court ruling, Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, which had found a protectible entitlement in parole
applications by inmates in Nebraska state prisons. 70 The Ninth Circuit
found that the Griffeth case, like Greenholtz, involved statutory entitlement
and stated that the authorizing statute coupled with the implementing
regulations of the county creates a legitimate claim of entitlement and

61. Griffeth, 603 F.2d at 118 (9th Cir. 1979).
62. Griffeth v. Detrich, 455 U.S. 970 (1980), cert. denied (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But cf. Bernhardt
v. Alameda County Bd. of Supervisors, 58 Cal. App. 3d 806, 809, 130 Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (1976) (holding that

Alameda County's general assistance eligibility regulations were invalid without reaching the constitutional
issues raised by plaintiffs).
63. Griffeth, 603 F.2d at 120.

64.
65.

Id,
Id

66.

Id at 119.

67.

Id

68.
69.
70.

Id at 122.
Id at 121.
Id at 120 (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)).
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expectancy of benefits in persons who claim to meet the eligibility

requirements. 1
An absence of post-Griffeth case law regarding federal constitutional
issues in California's local assistance programs contrasts sharply with the
large number and broad scope of cases interpreting the state law governing
these programs.72 The remainder of this Article discusses the legislative
history and recent case law developments for the state statutes most
relevant to setting standards for counties' indigent assistance programs,
particularly focusing on the level of medical care required for these

programs.7 3
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF STATUTES CONCERNING
STANDARDS FOR COUNTY SERVICES TO INDIGENTS

The California laws that are most relevant to setting minimum
standards for a county's medical assistance obligations to its indigent
residents are the Beilenson Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section
17000, and Welfare and Institutions Code section 10000. The legislative
history of each of these laws reveals that most of their amendments have
been relatively minor compared to the statutory changes made in 1991,
1992, and 1993. The real impact of these amendments will not be known

71. Id. at 121.
72. See infranotes 149-210 and accompanying text (discussing the cases pertaining to state law governing
county indigent care programs).
73. In addition to constitutional questions regarding California's general assistance programs, one court
recently considered tort claims based on the § 17000 mandate. Benjamin v. County of Lake, 235 Cal. App. 3d
1574, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 604 (1991), withdrawn, Feb. 27, 1992. In that case, medically indigent adults who were
denied dental treatment sued Lake County for damages, claiming that the county had breached a mandatory duty
to provide dental treatment. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that there was no basis
for a cause of action for damages under § 17000. Id. Plaintiffs claimed that the county had a mandatory duty
to provide them with dental care, based on California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 17000 and 10000. Id
at 607. The court rejected this claim, finding that the county was required to adopt some sort of standards and
that these standards needed to be "humane," but that there was "no specific statutory mandate... [to] adopt
standards providing dental care or, indeed, any particular care at all." Id. The court also considered whether §
17000 protected against the kind of risk of injury suffered by plaintiffs. Id. at 608. Here, the court looked to
public policy issues in deciding whether the county owed plaintiffs a duty of care and could therefore be
negligent toward them. Id. These general policy issues included the social utility of the county's activities, the
workability of a rule of care, parties' relative ability to bear financial burden of injury and to spread loss, the
statutes and judicial precedents which color the parties' relationship, and the legal role and budget limitations
of a public agency defendant. Id. The court seemed especially persuaded by two other observations it made about
the county role in providing and financing indigent medical care: that counties encounter difficulty establishing
a workable rule of care because they are "given very little guidance", presumably by the state statutes, and the
court's reluctance to "exercise ... judicial hindsight," thereby exposing counties to the "excessive liability" of
potential tort damages. Id.
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until enough time has passed for evaluation of any changes in county
programs and the corresponding case law has developed. Even so, it is
clear that the statutory framework for county assistance programs, and
particularly for indigent medical care, looks quite different now than it did
only a few years ago.
A. The Beilenson Act
A decade after Medicaid's enactment, a law was added to the
California Health and Safety Code that specifically governed procedures
and standards for the medical care portion of a county's larger indigent
care responsibilities. The stated purpose of this law, commonly referred to
as the "Beilenson Act,"' was to "insure that the duty of counties to
provide health care to indigents is properly and continuously fulfilled."7 5
Any county planning to change the management of county medical
facilities or otherwise reduce the level of health care services provided to
indigents was required to give prior notice to the State Department of
Health.76 The County Board of Supervisors was additionally required to
hold public hearings prior to proposed service cuts and to "make findings
based on these hearings that their proposed action will not have a
detrimental impact" on indigent health care in the county. 7 Prior to its
partial repeal in 1992, the Beilenson Act's "community standard" language
was twice affected by legislative actions. In 1978, concern about county
budgets following voter approval of Proposition 1378 prompted the state
to suspend the Beilenson Act for the 1978-79 fiscal year.79 The drafters
of this suspension chose to limit their action to the current budget year and
to use budget language instead of directly changing the language of the
Beilenson Act.8 0 Reports made after the Beilenson Act requirements

74. 1974 Cal. Stat. ch. 810, sec. 1, at 1764 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1442), repealed
by 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 719, sec. 1., at 2880. The author of the legislation creating these new statutes was
California State Senator Anthony Beilenson. Workman, supra note 10, at 353 n.148.

75.

1974 Cal. Stat. ch. 810, sec. 1, at 1764 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFTY CODE § 1442), repealed

by 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 719, sec. 1., at 2880.

76.

1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 719, sec. 1, at 2881 (repealing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1442).

77. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 719, sec. 2, at 2881 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1442.5).
These hearings were commonly referred to as "Beilenson hearings."
78. The Initiative Constitutional Amendment - Property Tax Limitation, Prop., §§ 1-6 (codified at CAL.
CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6 (implementing legislation codified at CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 50-100.5). This
ballot initiative limited a county's tax assessments on property within its boundaries, Id.
79.
1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 292, sec. 20(c), at 604 (repealing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETr CODE §§ 1442, 1442.5)

(uncodified) (stating that the statute was suspended for one year).
80. I.
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resumed effect indicated that only one of California's fifty-eight counties
closed, sold, leased, or transferred its county hospital during 1978.8"
Thus, one can assume that the one-year absence of a "Beilenson" hearing
and reporting requirement did not greatly affect county hospital closures
82
that year.

More than a decade later, more changes were made to the Beilenson
Act as part of state budget negotiations and limited to one fiscal year. This
time, the changes were aimed at the standard of care for services provided

in county programs of indigent medical care. One of the 1990 budget
legislation provisions stated that the Beilenson Act's requirements
not require counties to exceed the Medi-Cal standard of care,
increase eligibility or expand the scope of their health services.83
The summer of 1992 brought unprecedented delays in adopting
state budget 4 due in large part to the difficulties presented by a

should
nor to
a final
record

level state budget deficit." Although 1992 amendments to the Act made
several changes to the advance notice and procedural requirements for a

81. Tehama County closed its hospital sometime in 1978, but now operates a skilled nursing facility.
PETER ABBOTT', COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES BRANCH, HEALTH & WELFARE AGENCY, A REPORT TO THE
CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE ON COUNTY MEDICAL FACIIIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985-86 Appendix C
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).This document contains a list of twenty-one counties that closed
a county hospital any time from 1965 to 1986, plus ten other counties that sold, leased, or transferred their
county hospitals during that same time period. Id. Information on county hospital closures or other county health
service changes or reductions was annually reported from the counties to the state pursuant to California Health
and Safety Code § 1442(c). Id. The state then published a report to the Legislature containing this information.
Id.
82. The actual impact of Proposition 13 and suspension of the Beilenson Act during the following year
was probably softened by state "bailout" programs such as AB 8. For a summary of the AB 8 program to help
fund county medical care for indigents, see supra notes 9-44 and accompanying text (discussing the history of
county indigent medical care programs).
83. Chapter 457 provided that, "[flor the 1990-91 fiscal year, nothing in subdivision (c) of Section 1442.5
of the Health and Safety Code shall require any county to exceed the standard of care provided by the state
Medi-Cal program. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, counties shall not be required to increase
eligibility or expand the scope of services in the 1990-91 fiscal year for their programs." 1990 Cal, Stat. ch. 457,
sec. 23(b), at 1674 (uncodified). It is interesting to note the contrast between the "ceiling" (maximum) standard
used in the 1990 budget language and the "floor" (minimum) standard used in the 1989 legislation for counties
receiving Proposition 99 funds. The Proposition 99-related legislation required counties to maintain the same
eligibility requirements and scope of services for indigent health care as had been in effect in 1988. See supra
notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing Proposition 99).
84. Although California's fiscal year began on July 1, 1992, the main budget bill was not signed into law
until September 2, 1992. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 587, sec. 1, at 1852 (enacting the California Budget for the
1992 fiscal year).
85. The Governor and Legislature were seeking to eliminate a budget deficit of $7.9 billion. Telephone
interview with Jim Miller, Assistant Program Budget Manager for Health and Welfare, California Department
of Finance (Oct. 8, 1992). Total state expenditures for that fiscal year were projected to be approximately $60
billion. GOVERNOR'S BuDGEr SUMMARY 1992-93: FROM ADVERSITY TO OPPORTUNITY 7 (Jan. 1993) (copy on
file with the Pacific Law Journal).
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county's "Beilenson hearings,"86 the change with greatest potential impact
on standards of indigent health care was the complete elimination of
section 1442.5(c), typically called the "community standard of care"
provisionY The language of section 1442.5(c) provided that people who
cannot afford to pay for their health care should receive the same
availability of services and quality of treatment as non-indigent people
receiving health care services in private facilities within that county.8
The repeal of the Beilenson Act's community standard provision

eliminated California's only statutory language that speaks directly to
standards for counties meeting.their indigent health care responsibilities.89
Although this appears to have been a significant change in statutory law,
its precise impact cannot be known until counties, health care advocates,
and courts have time to operate under and interpret the new statutory
framework created by the Beilenson Act's repeal. As discussed below, this
interpretive process is complicated by the fact that section 17000, the

statute that defines a county's larger indigent care responsibilities, was also
recently amended. 0
B. Welfare and Institutions Code Section 17000

Section 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is the anchor for
any discussion of California counties' legal responsibility to care for their
indigent residents. This law speaks broadly of the counties' obligation to

relieve and support indigent people not receiving assistance from other

86. The most notable of the procedural modifications was the elimination of the requirement that the
supervisors holding the hearing make findings as to whether their proposed actions will be detrimental. 1992
Cal. Legis. Serv. cl. 719, see. 2, at 2881-82 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1442.5).
87. Although the statute never used those precise words, counties often used that phrase to refer to that
part of the Beilenson Act. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF CoUNTiEs, 29 LEats. BuLL. 32 (1992).
88. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 719, sec. 2, at 2881-82 (amending CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §

1442.5).
89. As discussed infra at notes 91-125 and accompanying text, this language provided a more specific
and probably higher standard for indigent health care than California Welfare and Institutions Code § 17000.
Curiously, there have been remarkably few appellate court decisions that discuss the meaning and application
of California Health and Safety Code § 1442.5(c). See Cooke v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 401,261 Cal.
Rptr. 706 (1989); Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. App. 3d 552,254 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1989). One
could hypothesize several reasons for the scarcity of published case law for the Beilenson Act's "community
standard" when compared to case law regarding § 17000. Perhaps the Beilenson Act's statutory standards are
so much clearer that litigation seems- less necessary; perhaps there have been many suits brought with §
1442.5(c) claims, but these claims have been settled before trial or decided at the district court level without
appeal; perhaps counties' medical care services for indigents have been better than their general assistance
programs and therefore a less likely subject of law suits.
90. See supra notes 112-125 and accompanying text (discussing the recent amendments to § 17000).
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private or public sources. Although the statute does not speak specifically
of food, housing, medical care, or any other specific means of relief or
support, there has never been any question that medical care is part of the
county obligation. 91 Any determination of legal standards for the health
care provided by counties to indigent people must rely heavily on
interpretation of what is commonly referred to as the counties' "[s]ection
17000 responsibility."
Historically, California counties have had general assistance programs
since the middle of the nineteenth century, and for many years these
programs provided the only available relief for indigents. 92 The Pauper
Act of 1901 provided:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support
all pauper, incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those
incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein,
when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives
or friends, or by their own means, or by state hospitals or other
state or private institutions [emphasis added].93
Except for the two italicized words, the language from 1901 is identical to
the current version of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000,
although there have been a few statutory changes over the years.
In 1933, the California Legislature replaced the Pauper Act language
with a new section that referred to "all able-bodied indigent persons" and
to the possibility of work requirements. 9' These additions only remained
in the statute until 1937, when the Legislature established the Welfare and
Institutions Code, thereby consolidating and revising the law relating to
and providing for protection, care, and assistance to children, aged persons,
and others specially in need. 95 The 1937 changes to what is now section
17000 brought the statute back closer to the original Pauper Act, except

91.

See, e.g., infra note 93 and accompanying text (showing that "state hospitals" have always been part

of the statutory language).
92. The California Supreme Court reviewed § 17000's early legislative history in Mooney v. Pickett, 4
Cal. 3d 669, 675, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 283, 483 P.2d 1231, 1235-36 (1971).
93.
1901 Cal. Stat. ch. CCX, sec. 1, at 636.
94.
1933 Cal. Stat. ch 761, sec. 1, at 2005 (explaining the purpose of the work requirement as follows:
"[s]uch work shall be created for the purpose of keeping the indigent from idleness and assisting in his

rehabilitation and the preservation of his self-respect.").
95. 1937 Cal. Stat. ch. 369, sec. 1, at 1005 (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE); see id.(reciting the
preamble to the California Welfare and Institutions Code).
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that the word "pauper" was deleted.9 Other changes included reinsertion
of the reference to "lawful" county residents and removal of references to
"able-bodied" people and possible work requirements. 97
In 1965, California extensively revised the Welfare and Institutions
Code. 98 Included in these revisions were general provisions" and a
renumbering of what is now section 17000.100 This section has remained
essentially unchanged from the 1937 changes to the present.' 0 ' Section
17000 reads as follows:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support
all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by
age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such
persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends,
by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private
institutions.'0 2
In addition to section 17000's mandate, the Welfare and Institutions Code
contains section 17001, which requires counties to adopt standards of
indigent aid and care.'0 3 This section originally required that such
standards shall be open to public inspection, but that requirement was
deleted in 1969. ' 04
Although the language of section 17000 itself has not been changed
since 1937, its effect on the standard for county indigent assistance was
potentially modified by a new law added during the state's 1991
realignment of state and county responsibility for health and social service
programs.Y0s Then section 17000.5' 06 expressly declared that a general

96.
97.

1&at 1097.
Id

98. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1784, sec. 1, at 3977 (amending CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 19).
99. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1784, sec. 5, at 3978 (enacting CAL. WEu'. & INST. CODE § 10000). The
importance of this statute is discussed infra at notes 126-131 and accompanying text.

100.

1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1784, sec. 5, at 4090 (enacting CAL WEL & INsT. CODE §§ 17000-17409).

101.

Although the actual language remained unchanged, "State" in § 2500 became "state" when § 17000

was given its current number. The chaptered legislation contains no intent language or other indication that this
change from upper to lower case "s" was more than a stylistic one. It

102. CAL WoLF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1992).
103. Id. § 17001 (West 1991). Section 17001 was a renumbering of the former California Welfare and
Institutions Code § 200.1, which was added to the Code in 1937. 1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 1323, sec. 1, at 2656
(enacting CAL. WEu. & INsT. CODE § 200.1).

104.

1969 Cal. Stat. ch. 371, sec. 55, at 907 (amending CAL. WELU. & INST CODE § 17001).

105.

1991 Cal. Legis. Ser,. ch. 89, see. 1-212 at 243-341 (realigning CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE). See

supra notes 9-104 and accompanying text (providing a brief history of county medical assistance); infra notes
106-131 and accompanying text (summarizing the realignment provisions).
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assistance payment set at sixty-two percent of the official federal poverty
line"°7 was legally sufficient.'0 8 In the following year, protracted state
budget negotiations'0 9 again reflected the politically painful challenges
of a depressed state economy and unexpectedly low state revenues.Y°

Counties' growing frustration with insufficiently funded but state mandated
activities caused increased mention of mandate relief for the counties,

particularly in the area of health and welfare requirements imposed by the
state."' Many statutory and budget changes contained in the 1992-93

budget legislation reflect the gravity of the state's fiscal situation and its
willingness to reduce the burden of its mandates on the counties.
The 1992 changes related to section 17000 provided more specific
guidance for counties choosing to link their general assistance payments
to another standard." 2 These amendments also increased the likelihood

106. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 91, sec. 34, at 410 (enacting CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE § 17000.5).
107. The official federal "poverty line" is defined by the Office of Management and Budget based on
Bureau of the Census data. It is revised annually by multiplying the official poverty line by the percentage
change in the Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers. 42 U.S.C. 9902(2) (Supp. 1993). § 9902
subsection (2). The payment level specified in § 17000.5 as originally enacted was also the level of benefits for
people receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter AFDC] at that time. In the 1992
amendments to § 17000.5, this implicit linkage to AFDC levels was stated directly. See infra note 111 (citing
the 1992 text of § 17000.5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Act).
108. CAL. WEL.. & INST. CODE § 17000.5(b) (West 1992). At the time § 17000.5 was enacted.
twenty-eight of California's fifty-eight counties had general assistance levels at or above this guideline, many
of them pursuant to a court order. Telephone Conversation with Karen Coker, Legislative Representative for
Health and Welfare, California State Association of Counties (Oct. 29, 1992) (copy on file with the author).
109. See note 36 and accompanying text (stating that the budget gap has grown from $7 billion in January
1991 to $14.3 billion in May 1991).
110. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (citing the state's fiscal decline).
111. In its summary of 1992 budget provisions, the California State Association of Counties speaks of
"significant mandate relief in health and welfare." CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION Op COUTNnEs, 29 LEGIs.
BuuL. 32 (1992).
112. The statutory language included, in pertinent part, the following:
(a) The board of supervisors in any county may adopt a general assistance standard of aid, including
the value of in-kind aid, that is 62 percent of a guideline that is equal to the 1991 federal official
poverty line and may annually adjust that guideline in an amount equal to any adjustment provided
under Chapter 2 [containing the statutes regarding the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDQ program]....
(b) The adoption of a standard of aid pursuant to this section shall constitute a sufficient standard of
aid....
(d) For purposes of this section, "any adjustment" includes ... statutory increases, decreases, or
reductions in the maximum aid level in the county under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program.
(e) In the event that adjustments pursuant to Section 11450.02 are not made, the amounts established
pursuant to subdivision (a) may be adjusted to reflect the relative cost of housing in various counties
as follows: [all counties are put into one of three groups, with one group allowed a reduction of 1.5
percent, another group allowed a reduction of 3 percent, and the last group a reduction of 4.5
percent]....
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of lower payment levels being judged sufficient in three ways: First, by
expressly allowing downward adjustments to the federally-linked county
guideline;" 3 second, by expressly allowing the value of in-kind aid to be
included in the county's general assistance standards;" 4 and third, by
specifying additional payment reductions that could be made according to
the county's "relative cost of housing."" 5 Lastly, the Legislature stated

its intent to abrogate existing county agreements, including court-ordered
stipulated judgments, concerning payment of general assistance grants
above specified levels." 6 The reason given by the Legislature for this

abrogation of county agreements was an unanticipated fiscal emergency in
California affecting counties' ability to provide welfare services." 7

During the summer of 1993, the Legislature and Governor again
struggled with painful realities while trying to fashion a budget for the
1993-94 fiscal year."' One of the techniques the State used to balance

1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 719, sec. 13, at 2887 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.5); 1992 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 721, sec. 1, at 2896 (amending CAL. WEuF. & INST. CODE § 17000.5); 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 722,
sec. 139, at 3011 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.5).
113. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.5 (d) (West 1992). The adjustments are linked to statutory
changes in the maximum aid level in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a federal-state
program whose maximum payment levels were decreased by 4.5% by the 1992-93 budget legislation, effective
October 1, 1992. Memorandum from F. Patrick Sutherland, Chief, AFDC Policy Implementation Bureau, to All
County Welfare Directors I (Sept. 2, 1992) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
114. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 17000.5 (a) (West 1992). This allows a county that provides, for
example, soup kitchens or homeless shelters to deduct the value of those services from a participant's general
assistance payments. Although the value of medical care provided to indigents could, theoretically, be treated
as aid whose in-kind value can be deducted from general assistance payments, the official staff analysis of this
legislation makes no mention of this possibility, and the parties negotiating this language never spoke of
including the value of medical care as an "in-kind aid" deduction. ASSEMBLY STAFF, ANALYSIS OF
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS To AB 1012, As AMENDED August 19, 1992, File Number 029390;
Telephone Interview with Frank Mecca, Executive Director, County Welfare Directors Association of California
(Oct. 27, 1992) (copy on file with the author).
115. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 17000.5(e) (West 1992).
116. Id. § 17000(a) (West 1992). The Legislature finds and declares that there is a fiscal emergency in the
State of California, which was not anticipated and that affects the ability of counties to provide welfare services
in the state. Id. Counties that have entered into agreements, including court-ordered stipulated judgments, which
require the payment of general assistance grants above the amounts provided under [the California law governing
AFDC payments] will suffer serious consequences if forced to maintain those levels, Id. Therefore, it is the
intent of the Legislature to abrogate the provisions of existing agreements, including court-ordered stipulated
judgments, that require counties to provide general assistance grants above the current [AFDC] levels .... hI.
§ 17000(b) states that the provisions of any agreement, including a court-ordered stipulated judgment, that
requires a county to provide a monthly general assistance grant greater than the [AFDC] amount... are null
and void. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 721, sec. 2, at 2896 (declaring legislative intent).
117. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 721, sec. 2, at 2896 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.5).
118. According to projections from the California Commission on State Finance, there was an $11.3 billion
gap between expected revenues and what it would cost to fully fund government services at the prior year's
level. CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, AN OVERVIEW OF TiE BUDGET SOLUTION FOR 1993-94 1
(July 1, 1993) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
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the budget was to shift $2.6 billion in tax revenues from local governments
to schools. 119 At the same time, a number of state mandates on local
government were suspended, eliminated, or reduced in scope. 2 During
this time, legislation was drafted that, if enacted, will, for the third
consecutive year, adversely affect the minimum standards for county relief
imposed by section 17000.2 This pending legislation will add yet
another section to the Welfare and Institutions Code," this one allowing
a county in significant financial distress to reduce its level of general
assistance aid to forty percent of the federal poverty level. 23 To show
significant distress, a county must make a compelling case that it would
not be able to maintain basic county services, including public safety, if
aid levels were set at a higher level.124 The pending law would also
make an explicit link between section 17000 and outside standards of
indigent medical care by expressly stating that Welfare and Institutions
Code sections 10000, 17000, and 17001 do not require a county to provide
1
or pay for a service not offered by Medi-Cal.2
C. Welfare and Institutions Code "General Provisions":Section
10000
Section 10000 first appeared in the Welfare and Institutions Code when
the code was extensively revised in 1965.126 The two amendments made
since that time both occurred in 1975, when "sex"'2 7 and "marital
status ' were added to that statute's anti-discrimination provisions.
Section 10000 also contains codified legislative intent that county
assistance be provided "promptly and humanely."'2 9 As discussed

119. Ua
120. For an overview of 1993-94 state budget "mandate relief' for local government, see CALIFORNIA
SENATE OFFIcE OF RESEARCH, AN OvERVIEw OF Tm BuDGET SOLUTION FOR 1993-94 11-16 (July 1, 1993)
(copy on file with the PacificLaw Journal).

121.

1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 72, sec. 1, at 905-06 (enacting CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 17000.6).

122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id

125.

Id. (enacting CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 17030.1).

126.

See 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1784, sec. 5, at 3978.

127.
128.

See 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 442, sec. 1, at 938 (amending CAL. WELl & INST. CODE §§ 10000, 18907).
See 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 1129, see. 8, at 2775 (amending CAL WELF & INST. CODE § 1760.4).

129. See CAL. WEuF. & INST. CODE § 10000 (West 1992). The entire text of § 10000 reads as follows:
The purpose of this division is to provide for protection, care, and assistance to the people of the state
in need thereof, and to promote the welfare and happiness of all of the people of the state by
providing appropriate aid and services to all of its needy and distressed. It is the legislative intent that
aid shall be administered and services provided promptly and humanely, with due regard for the
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below,13 the "humane" standard has been used in several court decisions

to determine the minimum standard for a county's medical care and other
assistance to its indigents.'

LI. SECTION 17000 AND STANDARDS FOR COUNTY
INDIGENT AID PROGRAMS

After reviewing the history and current text of the three most important
statutes concerning standards for county indigent care-the Beilenson Act,
section 17000, and section 10000-we now turn to the court decisions that
have interpreted and applied these statutes. This Article concentrates on
those decisions regarding legal standards for county assistance to indigents,
particularly decisions that were made within the last two decades and
involve standards for access to and availability of medical care.
A. A 'General View of County Discretion
How much discretion do counties have in their design and
administration of indigent aid programs? Although counties traditionally

have been seen as agents of the state without a clearly independent
political existence, 132 courts have also recognized that the local general

assistance program allows counties "unique" discretion because its funding
and administration largely comes from the individual counties. 33 One
clear legal requirement, however minimal, is based on the section 17001
mandate that counties adopt some standards of indigent aid and care. 34

preservation of family life, and without discrimination on account of race, national origin or ancestry,
religion, sex, marital status, or political affiliation; and that aid shall be so administered and services
so provided as to encourage self-respect, self-reliance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to
society.
Id.

130. See infra note 215-231 and accompanying text (discussing basic human needs and the Cooke case).
131. Section 10000 also includes a phrase that appeared and then disappeared in the legislative history of
§ 17000, then reappeared later when § 10000 entered the California Welfare and Institutions Code. This phrase,
requiring that county aid be provided as to "encourage self respect," has always been part of § 10000. This
language had also existed in the 1933 predecessor to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 17000. 1933
Cal. Stat. ch. 761, sec. 1, at 2005. This language was removed when the California Welfare and Institutions
Code was established in 1937. 1937 Cal. Stat. ch. 464, sec. 1,at 1406 (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§
2500-2615).
132.

Jacobus tenBroek & Richard B. Wilson, County of Los Angeles v. State Social Welfare Department

-A Criticism, 41 CAL. L. REV. 499, 503 (1953).
133. Boelm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 499, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 719 (1986).
134. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17001 (West 1991).
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In City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court,' the court
held that section 17001's requirements invalidated a county's assistance
program only when the county in question had not adopted any discernible
aid standards at all.' 36 This lack of standards forced the Department of
Social Services to "divide among the indigent and dependent poor such
sums as the mayor and the Board of Supervisors had deigned to
appropriate."' 13 7 Even when the City & County of San Francisco court
found an absence of any standards adopted by the Board of Supervisors,
this seems to have been only part of the reasoning behind the ruling
against the county.' There were three other facts that the court thought
worth mentioning in its opinion. 39 First, the county had much lower
general assistance grant levels than surrounding counties. Second, the
county's Department of Social Services had reduced monthly assistance
grants from $110 to $83. Third, the board of supervisors of the county-in
this case, San Francisco-may have acted from improper motives because
they were "besieged at the time by rumors of a mass 'hippie' invasion of

' 14
the city. 0

However, it is clear that counties must adopt some guidelines for
indigent assistance, the counties do have considerable discretion in the
manner in which they develop program standards and the content of those
standards. The general direction of California case law has been one of
decreasing judicial deference to county decisions concerning their indigent
assistance programs.' 4 ' At least until the 1991, 1992, and 1993, statutory
changes affecting section 17000 and the Beilenson Act
spoke specifically
42
to questions previously addressed only in case law.
The following discussion of recent case law is organized around several
questions regarding the legal sufficiency of a county's standards for
meeting its indigent assistance obligations, particularly those involving

135.

136.
(1976).

57 Cal. App. 3d 44, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1976).

City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 44, 47, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712, 715

137.

Id. at 49, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 717.

138.
139.
140.

Id
Id
Id.

141. See Los Angeles County v. Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d 455, 458, 260 P.2d 41, 44
(1953); Los Angeles County v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d, 634, 639, 122 P.2d 526, 529 (1942); Patten v. San Diego

County, 106 Cal. 2d 467, 470, 235 P.2d 217, 219 (1951); Madison v. City and County of San Francisco, 106
Cal. 2d 232,243,234 P.2d 995, 1003 (1951). See generally Kerry R. Bensinger, From Public Charityto Social
Justice: The Role of the Court in California'sGeneral Relief Program, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 497, 509-10
(1988) (explaining that modem courts are far from deferential to county judgments).
142. See supra note 92-125 and accompanying text (providing a summary of these statutory changes).
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health care. These questions analyze eligibility requirements for county
assistance, whether there is a minimum procedural requirement for counties
to assess their indigent residents' needs before adopting assistance
standards, the extent to which a county's budget problems can be part of
the decision about standards for assisting that county's indigent residents
and what the minimum standards are for services or assistance provided
by the county.
B. Eligibility Requirementsfor County Assistance
Before considering the type and amount of indigent support that
counties must provide, there must be consideration of the county's process
of determining people's eligibility to receive that support. 43 First, it is
important to determine who the incompetent, poor, and indigent people are
who benefit from section 17000's mandate. This Article concentrates on
the "indigent" part of that descriptive triad,'" focusing on those indigent
people in California who must rely on the county for food, shelter, and
medical care because they do not receive services under AFDC, Medi-Cal,
or other federally-funded programs. These are the people who are truly
members of a "silent, largely invisible" class, 45 the people who rely on
section 17000's mandate that local government provide for their
subsistence needs. One legal commentary defines "medically indigent" to
mean "the class of people who cannot afford necessary medical care from
their own resources or from health insurance coverage, if any.' This
commentary, however, noted the difficulty of agreeing on the elements of
medical indigence such as necessary care and poverty. 47 The Beilenson
Act's former "community standard" language contained the closest to a

143. AVEDIAS DONABEDIAN, BENEFITS INMEDICAL CARE PROGRAMS 3 (Harv. Univ. Press 1976); see id.
(stating that, "[i]n considering any medical care program... the scope of benefits and the conditions governing
eligibility are so intimately related that it is difficult to speak of one feature without becoming involved, to some
extent, in the other").

144. This follows the practice of most case law and legal commentary. See, e.g., Boehm v. Superior Court,
178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 497, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 717 (1986) (describing the counties determination of needs of
its "indigent residents'); Guidotti v. County of Yolo, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1552, 1555, 271 Cal. Rptr. 858, 859
(1989) (describing plaintiffs as "indigent residents of County"); Cooke v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 401,

404, 261 Cal. Rptr. 706, 707 (1989) (stating that "[i]n this case we consider the level of dental care counties
must furnish to indigent residents in order to comply with Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 10000 and 17000').
145. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (quoting from Emily Friedman, The Torturer'sHorse, 261
JAMA 1481 (March 1989)).

146. Bovberg & Kopit, supra note 11, at 859.
147. Id. at 859 n.9. "Opinions vary greatly on how much medical care is truly needed, on how poor one
must be to be truly needy, and on what constitutes inadequacy in insurance." Id.
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statutory definition of medical indigence in California. Even this language,
however, implied rather than stated a definition of "indigent" by referring
to "people who cannot afford to pay for their health care," and then
contrasting them to "non-indigent people. 1 4 Although it is difficult to
find case law speaking to the definition of indigent, one court has
addressed that word's relationship to the other two words used by section
17000: "incompetent" and "poor."'149 The court asked whether these three
words should each represent separate eligibility requirements for county
assistance, or whether an applicant could qualify by meeting only one of
these descriptors. 50 The court took the latter view.'' It rejected the
county's "strained" interpretation of section 17000 that read the statute in
the conjunctive-i.e., that to receive aid an applicant must be "poor,
indigent and incompetent... [emphasis in original].' ' 2 The court did
not permit the county to exclude from aid people not considered
53
incompetent.
Even though section 17000 does not define indigence, poverty, or
incompetence, it does make clear that the category of aid recipients it
defines is a residual one, consisting of people not otherwise receiving
private or public assistance 54 The residual character of section 17000
aid was discussed in Guimbellot v. Caulk, 55 a 1992 trial court decision
concerning Sacramento County's proposed restrictions on eligibility for
county medical assistance. One of the ways in which the county proposed
to limit access to its medical assistance program was to exclude people
eligible for Medi-Cal. 156 Although the court did not dispute that some
Medi-Cal eligibles may not be able to obtain medical care if insufficient
numbers of private providers accept Medi-Cal reimbursement, 15 7 the

148.
1442.5).
149.

1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 719, sec. 2, at 2881-82 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 676, 483 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1971).

150. Id.
151. Id
152. Id. The county had further interpreted "incompetent" to mean "unemployable" and disqualified
employable people. Id.
153. Id. "[These sections [of California law] contemplate that General Assistance will be given to

recipients who are neither unemployable nor legally incompetent" Id. (citing California Welfare and Institutions
Code § 11000).
154. CAl. WELF. & INxST. CODE § 17000 (West 1992). Counties are required to assist people "not
supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or
private institutions." Id.
155. Guimbellot v. Caulk, No. 530286 (Sup. Ct Sac. County 1992) (memorandum and order granting
preliminary injunction) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
156. Id. at 8.
157. Id. at 8.

1993 / Indigent Medical Care in California
court found that Medi-Cal alleviates the county's section 17000 obligation
1 58
to people eligible for that federal-state program.
In the same trial court decision, another eligibility question spoke
directly to the relationship between a county's responsibility to meet its
indigents' medical needs and its responsibility for other basic needs. On
November 1, 1992, Sacramento County used the newly enacted statutory
formula for general assistance payment levels15 9 to redefine financial
eligibility for its indigent medical care program." These new eligibility
criteria excluded people with monthly incomes that exceeded
approximately sixty-two percent of the federal poverty level.16 The trial
court enjoined the county from using these new guidelines, rejecting the
county's claim that the statutory formula for setting a standard of indigent
assistance includes medical services. 62 The court noted that the county
addresses indigents' medical needs through a separate program, thereby
demonstrating county intent that the general assistance standard not be
deemed a sufficient standard of aid for medical assistance. 63 Although
the court did not explicitly call for a factual assessment of medical needs
as the basis for the new eligibility guidelines,1 64 it criticized the county's
presumption "on the basis of speculation rather than facts" that any person
with income beyond the general assistance standard is able to meet his or
her subsistence medical needs. 65
C. Needs Assessment
Until enactment of section 17000.5's formula option, the substantive
question of what constitutes'a minimum standard of county assistance
often became intertwined with, or even secondary, to the procedural

158. Id. at 9. The court also noted that even if the county has no legal obligation to Medi-Cal eligibles
unable to find providers, the county may have "public policy" obligations to try to increase the number of

providers accepting Medi-Cal patients. Id.
159. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.5 (West Supp. 1993).
160. Guimbellot, No. 530286, at 5.
161. Sixty-two percent of the federal poverty level translates into $298 of monthly income for a person
living alone. Sacramento County's formula, like that of California Welfare and Institutions Code § 17000.5,
adjusted this base figure (62%) for reductions in AFDC benefit levels and for a regional housing differential.
Id at S.
162. Id. at 6 n.1.
163. Id at 6.
164. See infra notes 178-191 and accompanying text (discussing of the case law requirement that counties
make a factual study of indigents' needs prior to adopting general assistance standards).

165.

Guimbellot v. Caulk, No. 530286 (Sup. Ct. Sac. County 1992) (memorandum and order granting

preliminary injunction) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
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question of how counties arrive at a standard. The body of case law
developed around indigent needs assessment requirements now seems less
relevant for counties that choose to use the statutory formula to set general
assistance standards. However, this body of law remains applicable to
counties that choose not to use the statutory formula. In addition, important
questions remain concerning the indigent medical care component of the
section 17000 mandate,' 66 especially after partial repeal of the Beilenson
Act's procedural requirements for counties proposing to reduce health
services or close health facilities.1 67 The key case concerning county
needs assessments is Boehm v. County of Merced,168 the first decision to
require expressly that counties conduct a factual assessment of indigents'
needs prior to reducing county assistance. 69
Boehm, published in 1985, involved Merced County's 1983 reduction
in monthly general assistance grant levels from $198 to $175 per
person.170 There was no dispute that the Board of Supervisors had no
factual study of subsistence needs of Merced County's indigents on which
to base its reduced grant levels. Thus, the court concluded that the Board
could not have determined whether its reductions were the "fat trimming"
that they claimed them to be or were instead a "chiseling of the indigents'
bones.' 7 1 The essential components of such a factual study were spelled
out more clearly when the same parties appeared in court the following
year, after the county had completed the required study of minimum
subsistence needs. 171 This time, the court criticized the county's study
because it had included only food and housing costs, while the court found

166. See supra notes 155-165 and accompanying text (discussing Guimbellot v. Caulk).
167. Although neither case nor statutory law speak directly to the relationship between the procedural
requirements implied by § 17000 and those stated in the Beilenson Act, counties whose health cutbacks triggered
Beilenson requirements presumably fulfilled the indigent needs assessment implied by § 17000 when those
counties following Beilenson procedures for advance notice and prior public hearing. See generallyCAL. HEALTH

& SAFETY CODE § 1442.5 (West Supp. 1993) (describing the procedure required for closing a public health care
facility).
168.

163 Cal. App. 3d 447, 452, 209 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 (1985). The needs assessment requirement

articulated in this decision has been so closely associated with the Boehm decision that some later courts referred
to a needs assessment as a "Boehm study." See also Scates v. Rydingsword, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1085, 1088, 280
Cal. Rptr. 544, 545 (1991); Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa, II Cal. App. 4th 535, 541, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d

182, 185 (1992).
169. "[O]ur primary concern in this case is whether the [county] board [of supervisors] acted arbitrarily
in reducing the general assistance payments without having made a factual determination of the minimum

subsistence needs of its indigent residents." Boehm v. County of Merced, 163 Cal. App. 3d 447, 452, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 530, 532 (1985).
170. Ua at 449, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
171. Id. at 452, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
172. Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 497, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1986).
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that general assistance grants should cover other items such as utilities,
clothing, transportation, and medical care. 7 3 Any grant levels that do not

account for all of these needs must be based on a study showing how other
programs could meet the omitted need.1 74

Subsequent cases from other appellate courts further refined the
methodological standards for county assessments of indigent assistance
needs. One case criticized a county housing study that grouped together
housing costs for people in different living situations. 17' The court was
specifically troubled that the county's methodology implied that general
assistance recipients must share housing because the study methodology
failed to distinguish between people who lived alone and those who shared

housing. 176 Another case involved a challenge to general assistance
payment levels based on surveys of food and shelter costs that used
assumptions that county critics alleged to be faulty. Here, the court found
that the county had not met its obligation to determine actual costs of

subsistence.' 77
Two court cases involving application of section 17000 in Northern
California counties were published only months before enactment of a new
statute, Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.5, added specifics to
the broad mandate of section 17000.178 One of these cases raised the

question of whether Contra Costa County was required to perform an
indigent needs assessment before it could discontinue its emergency

assistance program for homeless people. 79 The appellate court held that
this program was not one intended by the county to address its section
17000 responsibilities, but was instead a discretionary supplement to

173. /I at 501-02. 223 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
174. Id.Note how this foreshadows the 1992 amendments to California Welfare and Institutions Code §
17000.5 regarding the value of in-kind aid.
175. Guidotti v. County of Yolo, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1522, 1565, 271 Cal. Rptr. 858, 866 (1989).
176. Id, at 1564, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
177. Poverty Resistance Ctr. v. Hart, 213 Cal. App. 3d 295, 303, 271 Cal. Rptr. 214, 219 (1989). "When
the general assistance grant level standard is challenged as insufficient by comparison with other government
indices of poverty the standard must be justified by an identified factual predicate concerning the actual costs
of subsistence within the county [emphasis in original]:' Id. Note that the court's comparison between general
assistance standards and "other government indices of poverty" foreshadowed the linkage to federal poverty
levels made by California Welfare and Institutions Code § 17000.5.
178. Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Cal. App. 3d 451,277 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1991), review denied,
April 17, 1991; Scates v. Rydingsword, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1085, 280 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1991). The legislation
adding California Welfare and Institutions Code § 17000.5 was enacted on June 30, 1991. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv.
ch. 91, sec. 34, at 410 (enacting CAL WELF.& INST.CODE § 17000.5).
179. Scares, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1091, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
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general assistance.18 This kind of supplementary program was not
17000 program,
subject to the same legal requirements as a section
81
including the requirement of a needs assessment.1
The other case also involved a needs assessment, but differed from the
Contra Costa case in that the issue before the court was more directly
addressed by section 17000.5's subsequent enactment. In this case,
Whifield v. Board of Supervisors,8 2 the plaintiffs challenged the
Alameda County Board of Supervisors' 1986 adoption of an ordinance
implementing an agreement with Legal Aid. t83 The agreement committed
the county to set its general assistance grant at $1 less than the state Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payment levels.'4 When
indigent plaintiffs filed suit against the county in November 1989,185 the
county grant level was $340 per month. 8 6 Plaintiffs challenged the
ordinance because it was not based on any factual study of actual
subsistence costs in Alameda county.' 87 They sought to compel the
county to conduct a factual study of minimum subsistence needs.' 88
The court found for the plaintiffs, stating that the county had
"impermissibly abdicated all responsibility for setting a standard of aid and
care . . . as mandated by section 17001" because it had not based its
payments on a current study of actual subsistence costs in Alameda
county. 89 Although the court found it understandable that the county
would want to simplify its process of setting general assistance standards
by negotiating with the local legal aid society and following the state's
AFDC grant levels, these actions were held to be an arbitrary and
capricious manner of setting the county's general assistance grant
levels. 1" It seems ironic and not coincidental that several months after
the Whitfield decision invalidated a county's decision to tie general

180. Id. A spirited dissent by Justice Kline disagreed with this holding, finding "absurd" the county's
argument that the question before the court was whether or not the county had intended that the emergency
assistance program help discharge its § 17000 obligations. Id. at 1106, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 557.

181.

Id. at 1098, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 552.

182.
183.

227 Cal. App. 3d 451, 277 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1991).
Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Cal. App. 3d 451, 453, 277 Cal. Rptr. 815, 816 (1991).

184.
185.
plaintiffs
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 455, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
Id. at 453, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 816. Unlike plaintiffs in most other cases discussed in this Article, these
were not represented by Legal Aid, but instead by the Bay Area Legal Foundation.
Id. at 455, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
Id
Id.
Id. at 460, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 821.

190. Id.
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assistance grant levels to AFDC grant levels, a new statute was enacted

that specifically allowed counties this option.19 '
D. County Budget Considerations
Although many

courts have publicly acknowledged

counties'

difficulties in meeting their indigent care responsibilities during tight
budget times, the majority view 192 does not accept budget constraints as

a valid justification for section 17000 eligibility restrictions or limits on
assistance and care. 9 3 In fact, one court stated that:
It is clear that section 17000 imposes upon the [county] a
mandatory duty to relieve and support its indigents, and the excuse
that it cannot afford to do so is unavailing . . . [citations to
California Supreme Court decisions omitted]. In each of these
cases, the supreme court considered the plight of the taxpayers, but

in each case concluded that their burdens were not so grievous as
to permit indigents, in the midst of plenty, to go hungry, cold and
naked, without fault. 4
If budget constraints require that a county cut back on its support for
section 17000 indigents, courts have required that the county be prepared

to show that it still meets these people's minimum subsistence needs for

191. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 91, sec. 34, at 410 (enacting CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.5).
Although the language of § 17000.5 as originally enacted spoke of tying general assistance levels to 62% of the
federal poverty level, this standard was chosen because it was the AFDC payment level for a family of one,
which was the standard used for general assistance levels in many counties under court order at that time.
Telephone interview with Carol Wallisch, Senior Consultant to the Assembly Health and Human Services
Committee (April 5, 1993) (copy on file with the author).
192. See Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 680, 1483 P.2d 1231, 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286 (1971);
Cooke v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 401, 413-14, 261 Cal. Rptr. 706, 714 (1989); Poverty Resistance
Ctr. v. Hart, 213 Cal. App. 3d 295, 303, 271 Cal. Rptr. 214, 219 (1989); Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal.
App. 3d 494, 503, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 722 (1986); City and County of San Francisco, 57 Cal. App. 3d 44, 4547, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714-15 (1976).
193. Proposition 165, which was rejected by the California electorate when it appeared on the November
1992 ballot, attempted to repeal this part of the § 17000 case law by adding a new subdivision to § 17000
stating that the county Board of Supervisors shall set general assistance grants levels "in its sole discretion,
taking into consideration the availability of county... funds for such aid... ." The Initiative Constitutional
Amendment, Prop. 165, § 19 (November 1992).
194. City and County of San Francisco,57 Cal. App. 3d at 44-45, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
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each of the basic necessities of life. 9 5 It seems appropriate that the court
decision containing language most sympathetic to county budget problems
was based on a factual situation in Butte County, which later came to the
brink of declaring bankruptcy.' 96 The court stated that, "[f]or whatever
reason, the Legislature has seen fit to place a large portion of the burden
of caring for the indigent upon those units of government - the counties
least able to generate necessary revenues."' 97 Even the court hearing
Butte County's case, however, firmly rejected the county's budget-based
arguments, finding that these arguments were not a defense to the county's
statutory obligation to provide benefits to indigent residents. 9
Washington v. Board of Supervisors'99 is the one judicial decision
that has allowed a county's defense of fiscal impossibility to justify
standards of indigent care that would otherwise be unacceptable. 2°° In
Washington, plaintiffs alleged that San Diego County violated sections
17000 and 10000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code when it imposed a
three month time limit on general relief payments to employable
recipients.20 ' The court acknowledged that this limit would appear
unlawful and that case law has historically rejected a budget-based defense
of county regulations that violate the requirements of sections 10000 and
17000.202 Even so, the Washington court was clearly influenced by its
factual findings that the county's three-month limit was precipitated and
driven by fiscal considerations 2 3 and that the county would have to
further reduce expenditures in other programs "of critical importance to the
overall health, safety and welfare of this County" if the county could not
realize the cost savings expected from that time limit. 204 The Washington

195. One court stated that, "[t]his court is not unmindful of the fiscal restraints imposed by Proposition
13 and the consequent need for strict control of all county expenditures. However, budgetary constraints cannot
justify excluding from minimum subsistence grants to the indigent allowance for each of the basic necessities
of life...Boehm, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 503, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 722.

196. The near-bankruptcy of Butte County in late 1989 brought increased public attention to many
counties' precarious fiscal condition. SIMPSON & JuNG, supra note 37, at xi, 26-27.
197. Cooke v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 401, 413, 261 Cal. Rptr. 706, 713-14 (1989).
198. Id. at 414, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 714. The court stated: "A lack of funds is no defense to a county's
obligation to provide statutorily required benefits ..." Id. Accord Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 680, 483
P.2d 1231, 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286 (1971); Poverty Resistance Ctr. v. Hart, 213 Cal. App. 3d 295, 303,
271 Cal. Rptr. 214, 219 (1989).
199. No. 647805 (Sup. Ct. S.D. County 1992) (statement of intended decision) (copy on file with the

Pacific Law Journal).
200. Id.
201.

id. at 4.

202.
203.

L at 16.
Id. at 9.

204.

Id. at 13.

1993 / Indigent Medical Care in California
court's approval of San Diego County's actions is based on somewhat
confusing reasoning that seems to approve a budget-based defense while
also arguing in the alternative that the aid limitation for employable
indigents did meet the standards articulated in section 10000.205 In this
alternative analysis, the court acknowledged well settled case law that a
county cannot deny an indigent person assistance merely because the
resident is employable." Then the court characterized the county's
limitation as "not inherently inhumane" and as a motivation for
employable aid recipients to find work and reduce welfare dependency,
thereby enhancing a statutory scheme that is meant to promote self-respect
and a desire to become a useful member of society. 7
The Washington court characterized the fiscal impossibility defense as
a reasonable one that challenged the county raising this defense to present
sufficient evidence that the money saved from indigent assistance
reductions was not available from other sources without causing substantial
harm to other programs of "equal importance and significance" to the
overall health, welfare and safety of county residents 8 The court found
that the county had presented sufficient evidence to support its defense of
fiscal impossibility.2" This trial court's approval of a budget defense to
justify an otherwise impermissible reduction of indigent assistance was a
significant departure from the prior case law. However, it appears to have
laid the basis for proposed 1993 statutory changes only a short time later
that will expressly allow a county in "significant financial distress" to
reduce its general assistance payment levels below the amount that would
210
otherwise be "sufficient.,

205. Md.
206. U,-at 13 (citing Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669 (1971)).
207. Id at 15. Section 10000 reads, in pertinent part:
It is the legislative intent that aid shall be administered and services provided promptly and humanely
... and that aid shall be so administered and services so provided as to encourage self-respect,
self-reliance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to society.
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 10000 (West 1991).

208. Washington v. Board of Supervisors, No. 647805 at 17 (Sup. Ct. S.D. County 1992) (statement of
intended decision) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
209. Ud.
210. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 72,sec. 1, at 905-06 (enacting CAL. WEuF. & INST. CODE §§ 17000.6)
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal); see supra notes 118-125 and accompanying text (discussing the
1993 statutory changes to the law governing what constitutes a "sufficient standard of aid" under § 17000).
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IV. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR MEETING HEALTH CARE
NEEDS OF COUNTY INDIGENTS

The question of a minimum standard for indigent health care can be
complicated when the words "standard of care" are used to signify
different ideas.21 The first, more traditional, use of those words alludes
to the requirement that a physician exercise the same skill and diligence
for any patient, regardless of the patient's income or payment source."1
A more recent usage of "standard of care" implies the amount and
comprehensiveness of health care services available and accessible to
indigent people. For example, the shorthand label often given to a recently
repealed part of the Beilenson Act followed the second usage by calling
this the "community standard of care" provision.1 This Article does not
address the first meaning of "standards of care," rather, it focuses attention
on the amount or comprehensiveness of health care services available to
indigent people. For this reason, the rest of this Article attempts to avoid
linguistic confusion by referring to standards for "levels" of health
care. 214 What is the minimum standard for the level of medical care that
must be provided to a county's indigent residents? The remainder of this
Article discusses the major appellate case on this point, summarizes some
differences between the medical and non-medical components of counties'
Section 17000 responsibility, and then presents a conceptual framework for
past and potential approaches to setting a minimum standard for levels of
indigent medical care.
A. The Cooke Case
Although section 17000 is the legal basis of a county's obligation to
relieve and support its indigent residents, it is section 10000 that has
played the more important role in case law discussion of the minimum

211. Partly through an unfortunate linguistic coincidence, the legal standard of "care," which originally
meant the degree of carefulness required to be non-negligent, has come to mean also what services themselves

are appropriate. Bovberg & Kopit, supra note 11, at 916.
212. See generally Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required ofMedical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549,
555-56 (1959); Bovberg & Kopit, supra note 11, at 876.
213. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing the effect of the repeal of the community
standard provision).
214. See, e.g., Cooke v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 401, 415, 261 Cal. Rptr. 706, 714 (1989)
(referring to which dental services were and were not provided to indigents when it wrote that "[Section 10100's

requirement of] 'humane' care is that level of care which remedies [petitioners'] pain and infection....").
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standards for county relief.21 Cooke v. Superior Court, the leading case
on minimum standards for county health care for indigents, relied heavily
on section 10000's commands that relief be "humane" and that "aid shall
be so administered and services so provided . . . as to encourage
self-respect, self-reliance, and the desire to be a good citizen useful to
society.' ' 16 The Cooke case is important because it provides appellate
court guidance in distinguishing between an unacceptable and an
acceptable standard for county assistance with health and dental care.
The facts in Cooke involve indigents in rural Butte County, which
participates in the County Medical Services Program (CMSP) administered
by the State of California.217 The plaintiffs in Cooke were found to be
eligible for the county's health care services, including dental care, but the
county had refused to provide treatment for dental services the plaintiffs
had requested.218 The court noted that the county did not dispute the
petitioners' assertions that they "suffered pain and infection and were
unable to obtain treatment" from the county. 219 Butte County provided
certain types of emergency care, but it did not cover any diagnostic,
preventive, therapeutic, or restorative dental care to deal with pain or
infection.22 One plaintiff, Ms. Cooke, had a painful front tooth but had
been unable to have root canal work done because she could not afford a
private dentist's fee and the county had denied this service because it
covered only emergency extractions." Another plaintiff had a painful
tooth caused by a lost filling, but had been informed that the county did
not cover fillings. 222 A third plaintiff had a history of dental problems
and cavities, and lost pieces of her teeth when eating anything
crunchy.2 3

215.

Boehmo v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 500, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 719-20 (1986); City and

County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 44,49, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712,714-15 (1976); see also
CAL. Way'. & INsT. CODE § 11000 (West 1991) (providing a secondary statute is § 11000, which states that

"[t]he provisions of law relating to a public assistance program shall be fairly and equitably construed to effect
the stated objects and purposes of the program:' For reference to § 11000 in the context of § 10000, see Boehm,
178 Cal. App. 3d at 500, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 720; Washington v. Board of Supervisors, No. 647805 at 14 (Sup.
Ct. S.D. County 1992) (statement of intended decision) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
216. Cooke, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 413-17, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 713-16.
217. Id. at 404-05, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08. There are currently 34 County Medical Services Program
(CMSP) counties, all of which have less than 300,000 residents. See supranotes 22-26 and accompanying text
(providing a brief explanation of the CMSP program).
218. Cooke, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 405, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
219. Id. at 406, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
220. Id at 405, 261 Cal. Rptr. 708.

221. Id
222.

Id

223.

Id. at 405-06, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
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The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments made under the Beilenson
Act that the county should provide them the same level of services
available to private patients. 24 The Cooke court determined that the
Act's requirements apply only when a county is closing facilities or
reducing services, a situation which was not before the court.22 The
petitioner's argument that the county must provide the same level of dental
care that was available through Medi-Cal was also rejected because the
court found that the 1982 legislation that transferred Medically Indigent
Adults from the Medi-Cal program to the counties and that created the
CMSP program was intended to "eliminate persons from the Medi-Cal
program, not to shift Medi-Cal standards to counties. ' 226 Even after
declining to apply either the Beilenson Act's "private" standard or the
Medi-Cal standard of care, the court found that Butte County's level of
dental care fell short of statutory obligations because the county's
standards for type of care available to indigents had not met Section
10000's requirement of humane care that encourages self-respect and
self-reliance. 227
After oral arguments were presented to the court but before publication
of the court's decision, Butte County adopted a new resolution that
increased the level of dental care coverage.228 This resolution specifically
allowed "dental services ... necessary to alleviate substantial pain, to treat
infection, to maintain basic function, to maintain adequate nutrition, and
to care for dental conditions which present a serious health risk. ' 229 The
court approved of this new standard, finding it sufficient "on its face" to
satisfy sections 10000 and 17000.23 0 At the same time, the court seemed
anxious to limit the scope of a "humane" standard. Achieving
"cosmetically pleasing teeth" was specifically excluded from this minimum

224. Id. at 409, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 710. Petitioners' argument was based on the portion of the Beilenson
Act repealed in 1992. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 719, sec. 2, at 2881-82 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1442.5).
225.

Cooke, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 410, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 711.

226.

Id. at 412, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 713. See supra note 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing the

legislation that transferred responsibility for Medically Indigent Adults from the state to the counties and created
the CMSP program).
227. Cooke, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
228. Id. at 415, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
229. Id. at 416, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
230. Id at 416, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
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standard, with the reasoning that such a goal did not involve questions of
pain and infection, and therefore, its denial was "not inhumane." 231
B. Some Differences Between Medical and Non-Medical Components
of Indigent Assistance
This Article provides several examples of the differences between
treatment given to section 17000's general relief and support obligations,
and treatment of its medical care component. For example, only the
medical care component of a county's indigent care obligation has been
subject to separate statutory provisions imposing more specific procedural
and substantive language regarding a county's obligations when it reduces
its level of indigent health care services.232 Only the medical care
component was benefitted by the annual distribution of approximately
$500 million dollars in new cigarette tax funds and the accompanying3
maintenance of effort requirements for counties accepting those funds..
In 1991 and 1992, when major changes were made to the statutes affecting
section 17000, these changes provided a more specific option for counties'
general assistance payment levels, but they were silent on the medical care
component of section 17000.234
There are several possible explanations for the different treatment given
to medical and non-medical components of section 17000's mandate. First,
there is the practical difference between the manner in which a county
meets the basic medical and non-medical needs of its indigents. Indigent
people typically receive medical care directly from county-reimbursed
providers such as county hospitals or clinics, but are usually expected to
meet their non-medical needs (e.g., housing, food, and clothing), with the
cash available from the county's general assistance payments. The more
direct provision of medical services provides two implicit assurances to the

231. hId at 415, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15. The court also commented on an interesting issue raised
implicitly by a petitioner who was denied cosmetic dental care and argued it affected her "employability." Id.
The court questioned whether counties have a legal or other obligation to provide medical care that promotes
their indigent residents' ability to find jobs. Id The Cooke court's observation that "[m]any people survive in

the workplace in a wide variety of occupations with imperfect teeth" is irrelevant to the court's stated standard
of "humane" care, but the court does speak, in dicta, to a broader standard that would promote employability.

Id
232. See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Beilenson Act's history and current
provisions).
233. See infra notes 248-254 and accompanying text (discussing the funds and requirements of Proposition

99).
234. See supra notes 105-117 and accompanying text (discussing California Welfare and Institutions Code
§ 17000.5 and the implications of this new statutory language for county indigent medical care).
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general public: (1) that county money is spent on the intended service 235
and (2) that the services received are adjusted to that particular person's
needs2 36 In addition, the fact that an indigent person who is ill or injured

receives more medical care services than a healthy person has seemed
acceptable not only because such a system allows adjustment for that
particular person's needs, but also because a sick or disabled person is
generally regarded as more worthy of aid and less at fault for being
indigent.237
Another possible explanation for the different handling of medical and
238
non-medical components of indigent aid reflects the political power
and social prestige3 9 possessed by medical care providers. Indigent
people receive health care from hospitals and physicians, while an
indigents' non-medical needs are met by a more diffuse and less powerful
collection of people, typically including landlords, store owners, and other
small business people. Poor people's lack of access to publicly financed

medical care is transformed into their medical care providers' problem of
235. Although general assistance grant levels are set at an amount that accounts for indigent people's basic
needs, cash grant recipients can spend their grants however they choose. In contrast, these same people cannot
"spend" their eligibility for medical care on anything except actual receipt of health-related services.
236. County general assistance payments are typically adjusted by only two or three pieces of information
such as household size, whether housing is shared, and the cost of living in that geographic region. See, e.g.,
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.5 (West Supp. 1993); Guidotti v. County of Yolo, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1552,
1557 (1989); Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa, 11 Cal. App. 4th 535, 540 (1992). Provision of
county-reimbursed medical care services is, of course, adjusted on a more specific person-by-person basis
according to an individual person's health status. See also Howard E. Freeman et al., Americans Report on Their
Access to Health Care, 6 HEAI.TH AF'F. 6, 10-11 (Spring 1987) (stating that poor and near poor individuals in
"fair and poor" health had more physician visits and greater number of hospitalizations per year than people in
that income category in "excellent and good" health).
237. A California commentator writing in the late 1960s who reviewed past and current social welfare
legislation found that "[flault is ... a central concept in welfare law... Changing ideas of fault are bound to
affect the structure of.welfare laws." Lawrence M. Friedman, Social Welfare Legislation:An Introduction. 21
STAN. L. REv. 217, 223-24 (1969). Another commentator writing in the following decade found that the
"concepts of 'worthy' and 'unworthy' poor [has] continued to have great influence on the formulation and
implementation of public assistance programs, including California's present system." Lisa A. Pearlman, Welfare
Administrationand the Rights of Welfare Recipients, 29 HASTGs U. 19, 22 (1977).
238. If we judge political power by looking at campaign contributions, physicians and hospitals wield
significant power. A Common Cause report ranked the California Medical Association as the number one
contributor to California legislative campaigns from 1984 to 1989, at which time it dropped to second place. The
political action committees of the California Hospital Association and the California Dental Association were
also among the top ten campaign donors in 1989. CAuI otRIA COMMON CAUSE, KIM ALEXANDER & MATrHEw
SPACEK, A FIST FuLL OF DoLLARS 1 (July 1991) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal). By 1992, the
California Medical Association was back as the highest spending "Lobbyist Employer" in the state, and "Health"
was the highest spending category after "Miscellaneous." CALIFORNIA SEcRETARY op STATE, LOBBYING
ExPENDmnRES AND TiE TOP 100 LOBBYiNo FiRMS, JANUARY I - MARCH 31, 1992 iii-iv (May 1992) (copy on
file with the Pacific Law Journal).
239. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982) (copy
on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
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"uncompensated care" when those hospitals, physicians, and dentists are

unable to collect payment for care provided. So transformed, the problem
gains politically powerful constituencies which are able to advocate
effectively for health care needs of otherwise disenfranchised, poor
people.m
V. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR LEVELS OF INDIGENT
HEALTH CARE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
FOR DIFFERENT APPROACHES

The following discussion sketches out four different approaches to
setting a legal standard for scope and accessibility of health care for people
unable to pay for that care and lacking public insurance (such as
Medicaid). Although this Article focuses on California case law and
statutes, the conceptual framework that follows can be used anywhere in
the country where people are re-thinking their legal and policy framework
for indigent health care.
The first, "maintenance of effort" approach, has been used in several
statutes regarding indigent health care.241 The second approach, here
labeled a "basic human needs" approach, is based on case law that has
used this kind of standard for both the medical and non-medical
components of counties' section 17000 responsibilities.242 The third,
"linked" approach, combines concepts from recent statutory changes
affecting the non-medical components of counties' section 17000
responsibility with concepts from health care policy.243 Finally, the last
approach goes beyond our current state of knowledge and information
about medical care to suggest some possibilities based on health care
research now in progress. 244
A. Standards Using Time Comparison ("Maintenance of Effort")

Perhaps the simplest approach to setting a standard for the necessary
level of health care is to designate a point in time as time zero, then
require or encourage a county to maintain the same level of health care in
240.

Bovberg & Kopit, supra note 11, at 870.

241. See infra notes 245-261 and accompanying text (explaining the "maintenance of effort" approach).
242.

See infra notes 262-272 and accompanying text (describing the "basic human needs approach").

243. See infra notes 273-285 and accompanying text (discussing the "linked" approach).
244. See infranotes 286-292 and accompanying text (suggesting possibilities based on current health care
research).

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 25
subsequent years as it did at time zero. The time zero and later levels of
health care can be compared generally, but are more typically compared
according to specific measurement criteria such as total dollars spent on
indigent health or number of health care visits by people at county
facilities. This kind of standard, often called a "maintenance of effort"
requirement,245 has the advantage of being fairly easy for a state agency
or a court to enforce because the measurement is a relatively
straightforward comparison of two points in time according to specified
criteria.
One example of a "maintenance of effort" approach to assuring
minimum levels of indigent health care was contained in the AB 8
program.' In this program, the state gave each county annual grants
that had to be matched by county health care expenditures at a level based
on that county's health care spending in the 1977-78 base year. 247 Ten
years later, voters approved a ballot initiative that directly affected
financing and delivery of indigent health care: the Tobacco Tax and Health
Protection Act of 1988 (Proposition 99).248 This initiative raised cigarette
taxes by twenty-five cents per pack and required that forty-five to seventy
percent of the collected funds be spent on patients who cannot afford to
pay for hospital or physician services and for whom no other
reimbursement is available. 9 The initiative also required that the funds
raised through its provisions be used only to supplement existing levels of
service rather than fund existing levels of service.2 The first legislative

245. See, e.g., CALiFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, FOR YOUR INSIGHT. MAJOR HEALTH ISSUES
FACING THE LEGISLATuRE 10 (June 23, 1993).
246. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 282, sec. 87, at 1047 (enacting CAL. WEu' & INST. CODE §§ 16700-16713); see
supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (explaining the Assembly Bill 8 program).

247.

The "match" amounts were recalculated each year and adjusted for county population and inflation.

See e.g., CALIFORNIA DEPARThENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCY, EXPLANATION OF

AB 8 PROvISIONS 4-7 (April 1984). This report covers Fiscal Year 1982-83, but published reports exist for many
of the preceding and subsequent fiscal years. Assembly Bill 8 was recently ended as a separate program when
it was folded into the 1991 "realignment" provisions. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 89, secs. 199-200, at 396
(enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 16720, 16800). See supranotes 9-44 and accompanying text (describing
realignment).

248. The Initiative Constitutional Amendment- Property Tax Limitation, Prop. 99, § 12 (codified at CAL.
CONST. art. XIIIB, § 12).
249. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 30122-30124 (West Supp. 1993). The funds are deposited into six
accounts, each with a designated percentage of the total funding available. Id. § 30124. The three accounts of
interest here are the Physician Services Account (10%), Hospital Services Account (35%), and Unallocated
Account (25%). Id. §§ 30122-30124 (West Supp. 1993).
250.

Id. § 30125 (West Supp. 1993).
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vehicle for allocating most of the Proposition 99 funds251 tied county
funding allocations to four maintenance of effort requirements. First,
counties accepting Proposition 99 funds were required to maintain health
care spending at a "match" level similar to the AB 8 requirements, but
incorporating higher spending levels by using 1988-89 as the base
year. 2 Counties were also prohibited from reducing the scope of section
17000 health care benefits and from imposing more stringent eligibility
standards compared to 1988. zs Finally, counties were required to

maintain at least the same number of outpatient visits in the two fiscal
years following passage of Proposition 99 as there had been in the year the
initiative was approved.'5 4
The Beilenson Act was another, earlier statute that took a slightly
different approach to setting standards for county levels of indigent

medical care. The Act's notice and hearing requirements can be thought
of as a type of maintenance of effort approach because they apply only to
counties planning not to maintain services due to closure of a health
facility or reductions in the level of services. 5 Under this Act, the time

zero of comparison is not fixed at a certain year as it is with AB 8 or
Proposition 99-related standards. Instead, the comparison is presumably
25 6
based on the time immediately before the county's proposed changes.

Although prior versions of the Act clearly discouraged or prevented a
county from making any change that would have a detrimental impact on
levels of indigent health care, 5 7 the Act's remaining requirements

251. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 1331, see. I, at 5381-82. This legislation contains most of the health-related
allocations from the almost $1 billion in Proposition 99 funds that were accumulated during the 18 months
following enactment of the initiative.
252. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 1331, sec. 9, at 5410 (enacting CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 16990).
253. Id. (enacting CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 16995), repealedby 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 719, sec.
11, at 2875.
254. Id. (enacting CAL. WI.F. & INST. CODE § 16995.2), repealedby 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 719, sec.
11, at 2875.
255. CAL. HEALTH & SAFEtY CODE § 1442.5 (West Supp. 1993).
256. The Beilenson Act describes the county's public notice required prior to "eliminating or reducing"
its county health services as including "a detailed list of the proposed reductions or changes, by facility and
service." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1442.5 (West Supp. 1993).
257. The original version of the Beilenson Act required county supervisors to make findings at public
hearings that proposed cuts "will not have a detrimental impact" on indigent health care in that county. 1974
Cal. Stat., ch. 810, sec. 3, at 1764-65 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFrY CODE § 1442.5). Changes made in 1982
weakened the "no detrimental impact" requirement by allowing cuts to be made even if the county supervisors'
findings were that a detrimental impact would occur. 1982 Cal. Stat., ch. 328, sec. 2, at 1569 (amending CAL.
HEALTH & SAFEWY CODE § 1442.5). Finally, even this weakened requirement was eliminated. 1992 Cal. Legis.
Serv., ch. 719, sec. 2, at 2865 (repealing CAL. CIv. CODE § 4384.5). See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying
text (discussing the Beilenson Act's legislative history as it relates to setting standards for the health care
counties provide to indigent residents).
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impose public notice and hearing requirements on counties that choose not
to maintain their existing indigent health services. 8
In 1992, the partial elimination of the Beilenson Act and of three of the
four maintenance of effort requirements in Proposition 99'9 presumably
reflects the spirit of county mandate relief that permeated that year's
budget negotiations' 6 as well as questions the actual effectiveness of at
least some of these requirements.261 Whatever the motives were for
eliminating these time comparison or maintenance of effort requirements
for county indigent health programs, this seems a good time to question
the real value of these kinds of requirements. Although they are fairly easy
to administer, "maintenance of effort" standards have no direct connection
with the outcome presumably of most interest to health policy makers and
funders: appropriate medical care that maintains or improves the health of
the people receiving the care. Maintenance of effort standards can even
have the unintended effect of discouraging improvements in health care
services by locking in the financing and service delivery patterns of the
base year or time zero, instead of taking a fresh look at the care being
provided or the health outcome for indigent people receiving that care.
B. Standards Using Basic Human Needs
A different approach to standards for levels of care compares the
services offered to indigent people with those available to the larger human
population. At the lowest level, such a standard has been variously

258. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1442.5 (West Supp. 1993).
259. All of the Proposition 99-related maintenance of effort requirements, except the financial one were
repealed. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 719, secs. 11 & 12, at 2875 (repealing CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 16995.2

and amending CAL. Wm.. & INST. CODE § 17005).
260. See, e.g., CAmLFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTmS, 29 LEIS. BULL 32 (1992).

261. For example, one participant in the 1992 budget negotiations observed that requiring counties to
maintain at least the same number of outpatient visits was not a difficult requirement to meet, when growing
cost consciousness has generally increased outpatient clinic use throughout the health care system. Telephone

interview with Michael Dinimitt, Vice President of Research and Health Policy, California Association of
Hospitals and Healthcare Systems (October 1992) (copy on file with the author).
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articulated in case law as one of subsistence, 2 minimum needs, 213 or
survival.
Throughout its relatively lengthy discussion of the appropriate standard
of dental care for indigents, the Cooke court rejected the lower level of the
"basic needs" type of standard because although it allowed people to
survive, this lower level failed to prevent pain and suffering. 265 Instead,
the court embraced section 10000's requirement that care be
"humane," 266 stating that: "'humane' care is that level of care which
remedies the pain and infection which petitioners have needlessly
endured."2 67 Although that court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that
they should receive the same level of dental services available to private
patients
or even Medi-Cal patients, 269 the court also disputed the

contention that certain dental procedures such as root canals are beyond
the county's required scope of care because they are "cadillac dentistry"
not necessary for survival27 This slightly higher, "humane" standard has

been described in another decision as minimally acceptable to the average
person.

1

Another court using the basic human needs standard cited the

262. See Poverty Resistance Ctr. v. Hart, 213 Cal. App. 3d 295, 309, 271 Cal. Rptr. 214, 223 (1989)
(utilizing an "adequate to meet subsistence medical needs" standard); Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors, 227
Cal. App. 3d 451, 460, 277 Cal. Rptr. 815, 821 (1991) (delineating an "actual cost of minimum subsistence"

standard).
263. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 44,46, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712,714
(utilizing a "benefits sufficient to meet [general assistance recipients'] minimum needs" standard).
264. Id. at 49-50, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17 (stating that the standard is "a level of aid [cannot be] below
what is necessary to survive"); Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 501, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 720
(1986) (describing the standard as "benefits necessary for basic survival").
265. Cooke v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 401,414,261 Cal. Rptr. 706,714 (1989). "Boehm II...
does not stand for the proposition that a county need assist only when life is threatened ... [ ] § 17000 requires
counties to provide "medical care,' not just emergency care ..
Id.
266. Id. at 414,261 Cal. Rptr. at 714. "In California Health and Safety Code § 10000 the legislature has
decreed that counties must provide care "humanely," and it is this court's duty to give that declaration meaning."
Id.
267. Id. at 415, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
268. This claim had been made under the Beilenson Act's "community standard" language. The court
stated that the Beilenson Act did not apply because the county was not proposing to reduce services or close
facilities. Id. at 410, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
269. Id. at 411-12, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
270. "For instance, abscesses may be treated either through root canal or extraction. The former is
sometimes referred to as 'cadillac dentistry' and is not necessary for basic survival." Id. at 406, 261 Cal. Rptr.
at 709. Although one of the indigent petitioners had originally been denied access to the root canal work she
needed, the county resolution that was finally approved by the court included coverage of "anterior root canals"
in its dental program. Id. at 416, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
271. Guidotti v. County of Yolo, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1552, 1559,271 Cal. Rptr. 858,865 (1989). The Court
stated that, "[tihe County emphasizes the level of general assistance is measured not by pleasure, generosity or
even what is minimally acceptable to the average person but what is necessary to survive or basic survival. A
person can survive by sleeping on a riverbank, in a car or perhaps even by the side of the road but that could
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and stated: "Everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services."272
*C. Linking Medical Care Standardsfor Indigent People with
Standardsfor Non-Indigent People
The 1991, 1992, and 1993 statutory changes to indigent relief
standards273 make explicit an idea implied by some earlier case law.27 4
This idea links indigent care and assistance standards to comparable
standards for other people needing the same kind of care. For general
assistance levels, California has linked county payment levels with state
AFDC payment levels. For health care, no similar statutory linkage
existed275 until the 1993 statutory changes affecting section 17000 set a
Medi-Cal linked ceiling on requirements for levels of county indigent
medical care.276 If California courts or lawmakers decide to make a more
direct linkage between legal standards for levels of indigent health care
and another standard, the two obvious starting places to create such a
standard would be Medi-Cal and a basic Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) standard. The scope of services available in a medical program is
typically described by a general statement of the criteria for including
specific services, followed by a listing of the services included in that
program. The general provisions for Medi-Cal's scope of services, echo the
Cooke court's standard of care by going beyond prevention of significant

hardly be considered habitable housing [emphasis added]." Id.
272. Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 501-02, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (1986) (citing
Article 25(1); G. A. Res. 217A(111), U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948)).
273. The statutory changes linked county general assistance payment levels with federal poverty guidelines
and state AFDC payment levels. See supra notes 105-125 and accompanying text (describing the statutory
changes to indigent relief standards).
274. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Cal. App. 3d 451,457-58, 277, Cal. Rptr. 815, 819
(1991); Poverty Resistance Ctr. v. Hart, 213 Cal. App. 3d 295, 303, 271 Cal. Rptr. 214, 219 (1989) (indicating
that indigent care and assistant standards should correspond to comparable standards that apply to other people
requiring the same kind of care).

275. But see supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the only arguable prior statutory linkage
between county indigent health care and Medi-Cal). This prior linkage was made in uncodiflied budget language
and was only effective during the 1990-1991 fiscal year. IL
276. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 72, sec. 1, at 905-06 (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17030.1)
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Joumral) (excusing a county from providing or paying for a service reduced

or eliminated from the Medi-Cal program).
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illness or disability 77 to include reasonable and necessary services that
alleviate severe
pain through the diagnosis or treatment of disease, illness,
278
or injury.
A medical care program's actual list of services offered is more
informative than its statement of scope of services. For example, Medicaid
requires all participating states to include a core of mandatory services
including: inpatient and outpatient hospital services, rural health clinic
services, laboratory and X-ray services, skilled nursing facility services for
people twenty-one years of age or older, physicians' services, early and
periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment (EPSDT) for people younger
than twenty-one, family planning services and supplies, home health
services, and prenatal care provided by a licensed nurse-midwife. 279 In
addition, a state may choose to include any optional services such as: care
provided by chiropractors, optometrists, and podiatrists, home health
services, non-hospital clinic services under the direction of a physician or
dentist, dental services, physical, occupational, or speech therapy,
prescribed drugs, dentures, prosthetic devices, orthopedic shoes, and
eyeglasses, intermediate care facility services, inpatient psychiatric hospital
services, and home and community-based services (only under a waiver
agreement) needed for an individual to avoid institutionalization. 280 So
far, California's Medi-Cal program has offered a fairly comprehensive
benefit package that includes almost all optional services.281
A basic HMO standard is another possible, ready-made package of
services to which standards for levels of indigent medical care could be
linked. For example, California Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi's
proposed health care reform plan links its benefits package to services

277.

CAL CODE REGs., tit.
22, § 51303 (1993) (providing that "[h]ealth care services ...

which are

reasonable and necessary to protect life [or] to prevent significant illness or significant disability... are covered
by the Medi-Cal program, subject to utilization controls...
278. d
279. 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.1-440.270 (1993); see id. §§ 440.1-440.270 (providing a list of required and
optional Medicaid services).
280. I
281. Governor Wilson's budget for fiscal year 1993-94 specified eight Medi-Cal optional benefits proposed
for elimination if California did not receive $1.5 billion in federal funding for "immigration-related services."
The benefits identified were outpatient drugs, optometry, prosthetic, orthotic, heroin detox centers, durable
medical equipment, hearing aids, and incontinence supplies. GovEiRNoR's BUDGET SUMMARY 1992-93: FRoM
ADVERSrTY TO OPPoRTUNrrY 30-32 (January 1993) (copy on file with the PacificLaw Journal). In fact, the
1993-94 budget signed by the Governor on July 1, 1993 preserved all Medi-Cal optional benefits except for
specified reductions in adult dental services. CALuORNIA ASSOCIATION OF HOsPITALS AND HEALTii SYSTEMS,
BUDGET WATcH 2 (July 1, 1993) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
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provided by a comprehensive HMO plan.282 The Garamendi plan specifies the following services: physician office visits, home health care,
prenatal care, well baby care, laboratory and radiology, outpatient drugs,
emergency room visits, outpatient mental health, and inpatient hospital care
(including mental health).283 Routine dental and vision care are not
included, although certain high-cost vision and dental procedures, such as
a root canal, would be covered.2 z4 This benefit package does in fact
generally correspond with the scope of services provided by at least one
large HMO, the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (Northern California
285
Region).
The whole question of linking indigent medical care standards to other
standards for other people assumes the continuation of several separate
systems for people whose eligibility is defined by certain income and
eligibility criteria. Ifthis state or this nation decides to move toward a
single, unified system in which every person has access to basic or
necessary medical care, many of the issues discussed in this Article will
disappear. Instead, concerns about the health care for low-income people
will take a fundamentally different approach, based less on deciding which
medical care low-income people can or cannot receive, and more on
assessing the health outcome of care that all people are eligible to receive.
D. Outcome or Public Health Measures
As state and county health care budgets come under increasing fiscal
and caseload pressure, policy makers may want to rethink the kinds of
standards used to judge the legal sufficiency of county health care
programs for indigent people. Rather than looking primarily at medical
care input measures, such as total program expenditures or total number
of medical visits, attention should be shifted to the health outcome of the
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money spent and of the services provided. 286 Although the area of health
care research known as "outcomes research" is just being developed, we
can expect increased interest in this kind of research for all areas of health
care, including health care for indigent people. For example, health care
researchers studied the effects of the 1988 closure of Shasta General
Hospital, a 73-bed county hospital in northern California that provided
74,000 outpatient visits and had more than 3,200 admissions in the year
prior to its closing.28 7 When researchers compared former Shasta General
patients to patients in another rural county that still had a public hospital,
they found significant declines in the Shasta patients' reported health status
on four dimensions: pain, health perception, social function, and role
function.288
Another new area of health outcomes research evaluates rates of
potentially avoidable hospitalizations among low- and high-income
populations. 289 For example, a team of researchers examined hospital
admissions in Massachusetts and Maryland for certain medical conditions
that can often be avoided if effective health care is provided on a timely
basis in a clinic, physician's office, or other setting that does not require
an overnight hospital stay. 290 When these researchers compared avoidable
hospitalization rates for privately insured patients with rates for uninsured
patients and for Medicaid patients, they found that people without
insurance or with Medicaid had higher rates of avoidable hospital
admissions than people with private insurance.291
An editorial in a leading medical journal has suggested that this kind
of health outcomes research be used to evaluate policy changes that affect
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the availability and quality of primary care.292 Ongoing development of
these kinds of health outcome measures should lead to information that can
form the basis for more effective standards by with which to judge many
aspects of our health care system, including county health care programs.
One possible way of utilizing this new health care research would be to
continue California's broad, flexible statutory language regarding indigent
medical care, but link this to a statewide advisory group charged with
providing more specific and up-to-date recommendations on the most
useful, appropriate measures of a county health care program's adequacy
or effectiveness. These recommendations of the advisory group would
provide courts with medical and public health expertise presented in a way
designed to be most useful in interpreting the guidelines set forth in
section 17000. This new approach would also give counties the advantage
of knowing in advance and with more certainty the specifics against which
their indigent health care program would be judged, and would provide
policy makers and advocates for indigent people with a more effective
method of evaluating progress toward the goal of maintaining and
improving the actual health status of indigent residents of California.
CONCLUSION

After decades of slow evolution, the statutory and case law regarding
standards for county-financed care and assistance to indigent people have
changed dramatically in the last few years. For non-medical assistance,
standards have become more specific and have been lowered in many
counties. For medical care, the standards have become fewer and less
specific. Any future changes in California's standards of indigent medical
care should continue the long-standing tradition of guaranteeing poor and
powerless people at least a basic or "humane" level of care, while
recognizing both evolving methods of measuring health outcomes and the
counties' need for flexibility in providing medical care.
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